3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 EDl Rumania EDl

should be obtained not through investments but through loans undertaken by the state. In this way Rumania would have full control over the allocation of capital and would not, except for the interest on loans, see the profits from the oil industry go abroad. The petroleum policy of the National Peasants, as formulated in 1929, was even more removed from Stere's recommendations than from the Liberals' policy. It was, however, perfectly consistent with their economic outlook during their term in office.

Rumanian transportation and communications had been in notoriously bad condition since the First World War, and the Liberals' policy of retrenchment had been particularly damaging to the railway system. The 1929 stabilization loan allocated $34,000,000 for railway expansion and $9,000,000 to pay off overdue railway debts. By a law passed in July, 1929, the National Peasants transferred the state railways to an autonomous public body, "to be administered according to commercial principles." [62] They also undertook to repair and extend the highway network, and abolished the primitive *corvée* which was still being used for road maintenance. In 1930 the International Telephone and Telegraph Corporation received a concession for the construction of the Rumanian telephone network.

The stabilization loan required a reform of the National Bank and of the state accounting system. In March, 1929, the government passed a series of new statutes for the bank; the principal changes were the abolition of the ceiling on the issue of currency, established by the Liberals' in 1925, and the limitation of the influence of the state in the appointment of directors. The bank was given somewhat greater independence from state control and powers to maintain the newly achieved stability of the currency. In July, 1929, the government passed a law reforming the state accounting system and the organization of the budget. There was no doubt that Rumanian state finances needed reform and modernization. The accounting system had been that of France of 1860, plus the accretion of a number of purely Rumanian practices, with the result that the actual condition of government finances at any given time was never known with any exactness. The new law, in reorganizing the preparation of the budget, exerted more stringent control over the expenditures of various ministries. While this law was well intended, its actual results in rationalizing Rumanian finance methods seem to have been very

62. Madgearu, *Rumania's New Economic Policy*, p. 50. The organization of Rumanian railways after 1918 had been altogether hectic. In 1925 the Liberals had given some autonomy to the railways; this policy was reversed by the People's party in February, 1927, and reestablished by the Liberals in August of that year.

496 ROUMANIA has had a hard and costly task in the restoration
499 of her railways and rolling stock to pre-War efficiency. This has been accomplished, and, in addition, steps have been taken towards the re-orientation of communications necessitated by the change of frontiers. A new line is under construction to link Braşov in Transylvania with Buzau and so with the Danube and Black Sea ports. It should play an important rôle in the movement of timber. The Olt valley line from Sibiu is being linked with that which runs from Bucureşti up the Argeş valley to shorten the journey from Bucureşti to Arad and western Europe. It is planned also to link up the Reciţa iron district with the Jiu valley coal field and bring both into closer communication with the capital.

491 ALTHOUGH there has been great progress in the reconstruction and improvement of the railways, road transport is still frankly bad. Only about 17 per cent of the roadways of the country are metalled and can be described as in fairly good condition. The bulk of the roads are mere dirt tracks, which vary in their resistance to frost and rain according to whether they lie on the dusty chernoziom, the loose brown soils or the more cohesive and better-drained podsol.

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543 THE FAIRS at Curtea de Argeş are held twice a year, each
527 lasting about a week and ending respectively on August 15th
443 (Assumption) and October 25th (St. Demetri). The association with Christian festivals is a widespread feature (the word "fair" is derived from *feriæ*, feast), the fairs attracting the crowds which gather for the festivals. It can sometimes be shown that the time and place of meeting are older than Christianity and that the periodic pagan assemblies later received the sanction of the Church. The fair, at any rate, satisfies a deep peasant instinct for worship, the exchange of goods and social intercourse.

THE AUGUST fair at Curtea corresponds with the early harvests of fruit—especially the plum—and, formerly, with the cereal harvests (buckwheat and millets) which maize replaced. It is probably connected in origin with the Lammas fairs of the West. The first of August, in the ancient Celtic calendar, marked the beginning of autumn and was celebrated as a harvest festival. In Ireland the day is still called Lewy's Fair, and is traditionally associated with the lighting of fires, with games and the making of marriage matches. Lammas fair is the largest of the year in some Irish towns.

THE OCTOBER fair would seem to derive its importance primarily from the return of the stock from the mountain pastures, when cheese and wool and surplus animals can be exchanged. A feature of the October fair is the high proportion of sheep and goats among the stock offered for sale. In the French Alps, too, the autumn stock fairs are the most important of the year. The maize harvest has by this time been gathered even in the Carpathian valleys, where winter sets in early. But whatever the position may once have been, the fairs are now more concerned with goods than with stock.

543 CURTEA FAIR-GROUND is situated on the flood plain, on waste ground kept free of permanent habitations by the danger of spring floods. The scarp leading to the first river-terrace rises steeply behind and is planted with trees which provide
[312] some shelter for peasants and animals. Here, too, under the scarp, is the well which supplies the needs of man and beast.
●[496] The main railway—terminus of the line downstream to Pitesti—has extensive sidings on the first terrace immediately behind, while the branch (timber) line to Cumpana runs

RUMANIA

THE RAILWAYS AND COMMUNICATIONS

● 4% The Rumanian railways may be said to consist of three different systems interconnected by a few single lines, which are inadequate for the purpose. These three groups consist of:

(1) The railways of the old kingdom, mainly radiating from Bucarest, and aiming at feeding the traffic of the Danubian ports and Constantsa;

(2) The railways of Transylvania, directed towards Budapest.

(3) The lines of Bessarabia, directed towards Odessa.

At the suspension of hostilities the railways were in a complete state of dislocation, the Austro-Germans having destroyed a large number of bridges on their withdrawal and left behind them only fifty locomotives. The railway tracks in Bessarabia, having formed part of the Russian railway system, were of wider gauge than the normal, so that the lines had to be re-laid and the rolling stock replaced. At first sight it would seem that there was an imperative need to connect western Transylvania with Oltenia by prolonging the railway line along the River Jiu, facilitate central Transylvania's access to the sea by linking up Braşov with Buzau, connect northern Transylvania with Bucovina via Vatra Dornei, and join up Bessarabia on the one hand with Moldavia, and on the other with the Danube mouths, so as to provide this province with a new outlet in place of the Russian port of Odessa. In 1912 a vast programme of railway construction had been elaborated by Al. Coltescu, then director-general of the railways. This comprised the construction of new lines which are of essential importance even to-day, namely:

(1) Extending the line ending at Curtea de Argeş to Jiblea, on the River Olt, thereby shortening the distance between Bucarest and western Transylvania by several hours.

(2) Constructing a new direct line from Craiova via Caracal, Rosiori de Vede, and Vida to Bucarest, and prolonging it to Urziceni and thence either to Buzau or Faurei.

10: Logio S-4 (no date) 1932 ED1 Rumania ED1

(3) Prolonging the line along the river Jiu and linking it up with the Transylvanian system at Petroşani.

(4) Constructing a line from Tecuciu to Faurei and Giurgeni, the latter at the mouth of the Ialomitsa river, building a bridge over the Danube at Harşova, and connecting the latter with Constantsa.

(5) Terminating the line Medjidia-Tulcea, via Babadag.

Owing to the war this plan had not been carried out, so that a very extensive amount of construction remained to be undertaken, the more so since, besides the lines enumerated above, several important lines had to be constructed in Transylvania in order to provide more direct communication between Cluj and Brasov.

It was roughly estimated that an outlay of some forty milliard lei would be required for the carrying out of the construction of the new lines considered indispensable for the normal development of traffic, but as this sum could not be raised locally, and as the economic policy pursued by Rumania since 1919 precluded the raising of so large a sum abroad, not more than one hundred kilometres have been constructed since 1923. This is an astounding policy in view of the paramount importance of railway communications, both from the point of view of the development as well as that of the defence of the country. Actually all idea of new construction has been abandoned, and the justification given is that the railways cannot be run economically; but this is entirely due to the prevailing mismanagement, and sufficient evidence will be offered in support of this statement. After spending vast sums for the construction of the line Braşov–Buzau, all work has been suspended, and no new lines are expected to be opened for traffic in the near future except some 45 kms. between Chişinau and Sachaidache.

At the end of 1931 the railway system consisted of 11,133 kms. of track, but all this was single track, with the exception of 203 kms. of double track connecting Bucarest via Ploeşti with Campina, and Ploeşti with Buzau. This total of 11,133 kms. also includes 716 kms. of narrow-gauge railways.

The railway lines in the new provinces were laid out to suit different requirements than those actually prevailing,

and the unification of the whole system can only be realized by the construction of connecting lines between what so far has been three distinct systems. The laying of double tracks on trunk lines is also imperatively needed in certain sections, such as that of Constantsa-Feteşti. Several offers by foreign groups were made for the reorganization of the railways, but the Rumanian Government would not agree to the stipulations set forth by foreign capitalists, namely, that they should exercise control over the expenditure and that they should be guaranteed repayment. It is indeed strange that financiers should be expected to advance funds without adequate security, especially to an administration which has been characterized by disorder and waste, and that to an extent surpassing what is customary even in Rumania. The methods employed in running the railway system are generally indicative of the chaotic manner in which the whole machinery of government is being run, and will serve to show that there is little hope for real improvement so long as there is no outside control.

The whole railway system had been endowed with an autonomous administration in 1925 by the Bratianu Government, but, as was to be expected, the chief purpose of the initiators of this measure was to create as many "cushy jobs" for the veterans of the party as possible, so that instead of a simplification and co-ordination there ensued a complication bordering on chaos. The disorder rendered control difficult, or well nigh impossible, and has facilitated fraud to an unprecedented extent. No year has passed without discoveries being made of sensational embezzlements perpetrated to the detriment of the railway administration, through which the latter was despoiled of important sums. Even as late as March, 1932, the Press was publishing details of a fresh scandal through which the State railways had been defrauded of several millions. The *Cuvantul* of May 15th, 1932, related that the chief cashier of the railways at Brasov had embezzled over a million lei. On September 7th, 1927, the *Argus* published an article by a former Minister of Communications in which the latter stated that "he estimated the loss suffered by the railways through lack of control to be about 25 per cent of their gross revenue," and he referred

to methods of fraud applied on a wholesale scale at Galatz by which the railways had been systematically defrauded. For instance, whole truckloads of timber forwarded from Bucovina and destined for Giurgiu, on their arrival at Galatz were fraudulently diverted to another destination, so that the consignee at Giurgiu had to be indemnified by the railway administration for the loss of his goods. In another article, published two days later, the writer enlarged on the lack of co-ordination among the different departments of this administration and the total absence of reliable data on which to form an estimate of the situation, a state of affairs that was positively chaotic. As an illustration of this he cited the fact "that while the Under-Secretary of State affirmed that the year 1926 showed a deficit of one milliard and a half lei, the General Manager of the Railways averred on the contrary that there was a surplus of 200 millions"!

Another paper, the *Cuvantul*, which had undertaken a vigorous campaign against the disgraceful disorder prevailing on the railways, referred in its issue of July 24th, 1927, to the following statement of the Under-Secretary of State for Communications: "It is enough to say that according to the accounts there ought to be one milliard and a half of cash, but instead I am 500 millions in debt. This situation is due to the fact that the profit and loss accounts of preceding years have not yet been closed." The *Cuvantul* proceeded to compliment the Under-Secretary for his outspokenness and to condemn M. V. Bratianu for having deliberately misled the public by affirming that the working of the railways was quite normal and that it had been carried on at a profit for the State. Both the *Argus* and the *Cuvantul* continued to publish articles emphasizing the necessity of foreign loans being obtained so that the railway system might be properly reorganized, and laying stress on the disastrous consequences for the country arising from the actual disorganization. According to these articles, the lines were in complete decay and were almost useless. "The rails of one-fourth of the track were so worn out that it was a miracle that trains could run on them. The number of rotten sleepers exceeded imagination. There were three times less locomotives than the normal average, and the railway junctions were

continually blocked up. . . ." On October 27th, 1927, the *Cuvantul* related how extensive frauds were found to have been committed by higher railway officials in Transylvania, and that the affair was being hushed up so that these persons might not be incriminated.

On March 3rd, 1928, the same paper enlarged on the collapse of the railway bridge over the Milcov, near Focşani, the construction of which had been entrusted to a favourite of M. V. Bratianu who, so far, instead of being punished, had been appointed to another post. The *Argus* of February 20th, 1929, in an article entitled "What has been done with the Railways?" cites the following facts: "It was decided to illuminate the railway cars with methane gas, and lamps and instruments were bought for this purpose. All these remain unused in the warehouses because it has since been found out that methane gas could not be used for such a purpose. . . . Lathes of a value of 40 millions were ordered; this is a quantity likely to suffice for a period of ten to fifteen years. . . . There are some 280 trucks loaded with corrugated iron. As the annual requirements of the railway administration are about two to three truckloads, this stock is likely to last a century. . . ."

With the advent of the National Peasant Party to power a slight improvement set in, but it was too much to expect that a system which had become traditional could be altered in the course of a few years. The *Cuvantul* of March 31st, 1929, commenting on the resignation of the general manager of the railways, declared that this was a good beginning. "So far our railways were not an institution for furthering travel and facilitating transport, but a counting-house for the sale, at exorbitant prices, of all kinds of manufactures of the various industrial firms associated with the Liberal Party. . . ." In previous articles the *Cuvantul* had described how the railway administration, being under the control of partisans of the Liberal Party, the latter had done everything in its power to promote the interests of members of that party to the detriment of those of the State. The carelessness and remissness of the railway administration may be gauged by the fact that it positively discouraged traffic on its own lines, and diverted it to foreign countries

to we understand why the railway administration has not yet excluded lignite from among the fuels of which it makes use. . . .'' A close examination of the items of the expenditure would probably reveal undue liberality under certain heads. Thus the total expenditure for 1930 amounted to 12,577,602,209 lei, of which 2,700 millions were devoted to the upkeep and repair of rolling stock, 746 millions to the upkeep of the lines, 1,830 millions to fuel, 6,743 millions to salaries, wages, etc.

Out of the proceeds of the 1929 loan, some 4,751 million lei were earmarked for the reconditioning of the railways. The sum was to be employed for the renewal of the tracks, the purchase of rolling stock, the construction of new lines, and for the improvement and enlargement of workshops. Expenditure on this last item was exceedingly ill-advised, for the railway administration had entered into engagements with certain foreign firms, on the strength of which the latter had built repair-shops, such as the "Astra" Company at Arad, the "Lemaître" workshops at Reşiţa, and the Franco-Romana Co. at Braila. In 1929 there still remained four outstanding contracts expiring in 1935, and guaranteeing a yearly expenditure of 640 millions for constructing locomotives, and two other contracts expiring in 1939 which provided for the repairing of locomotives, of a value of 335 millions. As soon as the railway administration was able to use its new workshops it proceeded to disregard these contracts, and as a result these private firms had to close down and dismiss their workmen. The *Argus* of 11th May, 1932 denounces the railway administration for its indefensible attitude in the following terms:

"These industries have suffered immense losses. Their staff had to be dismissed, and they have been rendered incapable of meeting their engagements. All of them will put in claims for damages, and we can hardly doubt that Justice, taking into consideration the contracts made with the railways, will be found to pronounce in their favour. Who is to pay the damages? Naturally the State, which is also going to lose the taxes which it would have raised on the contracts had they been carried out. But the greatest loss consists in

the loss of confidence which this stupid policy of disregarding legal engagements entails for the State and its administrations."

The *Dreptatea* of May 19th, 1932, gives an example of the prevailing favouritism in the granting of contracts by the railway administration. Thus tenders were invited for the renovation of the signalling apparatus on the line Feteşti–Cernavoda in August, 1931, but as the administration desired to favour a certain firm no contract was passed, but finally the order was placed with this particular firm at a price of eleven million lei when other firms had undertaken to do the work for only six and a half millions. Naturally the *Dreptatea* takes the Director-General, M. Ionescu, to task for his attitude, and declares that no one should wonder if the railway administration runs into deficits every year. An additional cause for the losses incurred is the overstaffing of the administration, and especially the numerous sinecures that have been created for the benefit of persons enjoying official protection. A few years ago it was impossible to find out how the administration was being run, for no proper balance sheets had been drawn up for years. Fortunately, a British expert has been invited to supervise the accounts, so that data are now available up to date. But this is obviously an inadequate measure, and the railways will become a paying concern capable of responding to the necessities of the country only when and if they are placed under foreign control, or under the management of some capable and honest Rumanian effectively shielded by foreign influence from all interference by political circles. . . . The slovenly methods so far employed in the railway administration have hampered not only the internal development of the country but have also prevented it from increasing its revenues from traffic transit across Rumania; for the country controls two big trade routes, namely that from Poland and the Baltic States towards the Black Sea and the Near East, which used to be one of the great trade routes of old, and that from Central Europe through Transylvania to Constantsa.

There are two alternatives to the latter, namely the Danube and that through Yugoslavia, so that if the Rumanian railways were properly managed they could easily

secure a decent share of the traffic, but apparently this is being diverted to the Danube route. In fact the "Commission Internationale du Danube" reported that the river-borne traffic in 1931 had reached the highest figure since the end of the war. This was due not only to the abundant harvests of 1931, but also to increased petroleum transport from both Rumania and Russia to Central Europe. Certain singular anomalies were recorded in this river-borne traffic, namely, that while grain was conveyed from Russia up to Vienna and Ratisbonne, Hungarian grain was being carried downstream for shipment via Sulina to Antwerp and Hamburg.

In order to attract Polish traffic, the Rumanian Government some years ago proposed to create free zones at Galatz, Braila, and Constantsa. A bridge, also, was to be constructed across the Danube between Giurgiu and Rustchuk, the Polish Government even offering to defray half the expenses, but for the present all these schemes seem to have been shelved.

COMMUNICATIONS

In a report made by the Minister of Public Works and published by the *Adeverul* in its issue of January 14th, 1932, the following details were given respecting the length and state of the roads.

The state of the roads is lamentable; most of these arteries are impassable, and a superficial reparation would prove useless. The following table will give an approximate idea of their condition:

	Length in Kilometers
Roads paved in stone	
Good condition	16,118
Medium condition	27,961
Bad condition	14,949
Roads laid in gravel	9,318
Natural unlaid roads...	33,636
Total	101,982

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
BLACK SEA
RUSSIA
BESSARABIA
MOLDAVIA
BUCOVINA
MARAMURESH
TRANSYLVANIA
WALLACHIA
BUCHAREST
VARNA
BULGARIA
POLAND
CZECHOSLOVAKIA
HUNGARY
CRISHANA
YUGOSLAVIA
FRONTIERS
MAIN RAILWAY LINES

p 203

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ED1 Rumania ED1

[Bucarest]
[The Dobrudja]

Bucarest is also the chief railway centre of Rumania.

Giurgiu on the Danube, south of Bucarest and the terminus of one of the oil pipe-lines from Ploesti, is one of the main Rumanian wheat and oil ports. Another Danubian port, where great quantities of wheat are handled, is Braila with a population of about 70,000.

There are no natural barriers to communications in Muntenia. In the south the chief flow of traffic is carried by the Danube. Rail and road communications from Transylvania pass through the Predeal and a railway line leads over the Danube to the Dobrudja.

THE DOBRUDJA (Dobrogea[R]).[1] Up till 1878 the whole of the Dobrudja belonged to Bulgaria. Ever since, this province has been a bone of contention between Rumania and Bulgaria. The northern part of the Dobrudja was awarded to Rumania in 1878 to compensate her for the loss of Southern Bessarabia to Russia. The southern part of the province was ceded by Bulgaria after her defeat at the hands of her neighbours in the Second Balkan War in 1913. This region was returned to Bulgaria in 1940.

Geographically the Dobrudja is the north-eastern corner of the Balkan Peninsula. Its boundaries are in the north and west the Danube and in the east the Black Sea. There are three distinct regions: the delta of the Danube, the forests of Babadag, and farther south the steppe, which is the most fertile

[1] The letter R, H or G following a geographical term denotes a Rumanian, Hungarian or German name, respectively.

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ED1 Rumania ED1

[Moldavia]
[The Banat]

361 504 Another important town, and the greatest Rumanian port on the Danube, is Galati with a population of about 75,000. Galati lies about a hundred miles from the Black Sea, but the harbour is so placed that sea-going ships can enter the port through the delta and anchor there all through the ice-free period. From Galati timber, wheat and maize from all over Rumania are sent abroad. Incoming cargoes of industrial goods are unloaded there.

• [496] The only line leading directly to Transylvania goes over the Ghimes Pass. The traffic to Bessarabia is carried by four railway lines.

The New Territories

131 175 [161] The New Territories, acquired by Rumania after the war of 1914–18 and partly lost since 1940, cover an area of 62,800 square miles and were inhabited in 1940 by about 10,500,000 people. The Banat, the Crisana, Maramures and Transylvania formed, up to 1918, parts of Hungary; the Bukovina belonged to Austria, and Bessarabia was taken from Russia. Many parts of the New Territories were agriculturally and industrially better developed than the Old Kingdom.

131 161 **The Banat.** The Rumanian part of the Banat covers an area of about 7,400 square miles and has a population of 1,000,000. The province is bordered in the north by the River Mures[R] (Maros[H], Marosch[G]), in the west by the Yugoslav part of the Banat, in the south by the Danube, and in the east by the Carpathians. The north-western part of the province is

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12: Kormos S-4, 5 (no date) 1944
ED1 Rumania ED1
[The Crisana]
[Maramures]

mostly Hungarians, and occupies a similarly important position. Here there are numerous factories, including mills, railway shops and locomotive works and textile factories. Satu-Mare (Szatmar[H]), with 60,000 inhabitants, is the largest town in the Northern Crisana.

After the Great War the Crisana, which was first occupied by the Hungarians in the tenth century and subsequently colonized by them, was awarded to Rumania. Under the Vienna Award of 1940 part of the Crisana was returned to Hungary, with a considerable Rumanian population.

By the same decision the province of Maramures (Marmaros[H]) (about 1,350 square miles), inhabited by over 150,000 people, acquired by Rumania in 1918, was returned to Hungary. Geographically Maramures is a continuation of the Czechoslovak province of Ruthenia. It is enclosed on all sides by chains of mountains covered with thick forests whose great density is rare even in the Carpathians, which are famous for their wealth of trees. It is not easily accessible except by a solitary railway line which comes from Transylvania and leads to Ruthenia. The small population consists of Ruthenians, Rumanians, Jews, Slovaks and Hungarians and is typical of the medley of races to be found in quite small areas of this part of Europe. Owing to the mountainous nature of the country there is little agriculture. The chief occupation of the inhabitants is the felling of trees. The most valuable asset of the province is its mineral wealth. There is oil, gold, copper, salt and coal. The capital and only major town of Maramures is Sighet (Marmaros-Sziget[H]) with a large Jewish population. Sighet, a town of

728 [135] of requirements for sulphuric-acid production. Of lesser importance were the salt and coal deposits.

[313] The forest resources of Northern Transylvania are estimated to have accounted for as much as 25 per cent. of pre-war timber production. Apart from timber the food and leather industries appear to have been the most developed. This [311] area was principally made up of forests and pastures; the arable land provided no surplus [333] after local needs had been covered. Of livestock losses the most outstanding feature was nearly 2 million sheep.

●[496] The railway system, and particularly the railway administration, was severely handicapped by the change of frontiers, which in places cut one part of Rumania off from the other.

Caliacra and Durostor, the two ceded Dobrujan provinces, are mainly agricultural, and though producing a small surplus, contributed little to Rumania's total agricultural output. Of more significance is the cotton-growing area. There are no known mineral deposits, and industry in this area is on a very small scale, relying mainly on handicrafts.

TRANSNISTRIA

727 Transnistria is the name which has been given to the territory lying between the Dniester and the Bug, which was given to Rumania to administer in 1941 subsequent to its capture from the U.S.S.R. by Rumanian and German troops. Transnistria is part of the Southern Ukraine and is mainly agricultural, while such industry as existed has been of no use to the Rumanians on account of the heavy destruction carried out by the Russians. It is probably true to say that this territory has been more of a financial liability than an asset to Rumania on account of the heavy expenditure entailed in repairs, particularly of railways and bridges. Some little advantage has, however, been gained from the harvest of 1942-3.

A. RAILWAYS

I. Pre-War Conditions

1. Communications

496

Before the outbreak of the present war, the Rumanian State Railways' system was as follows:

	km.	miles
Total	11,375	7,053
of which:		
Standard gauge ..	10,715	6,643
Narrow gauge ..	660	410

More than half of this mileage had been acquired following the 1914–18 war, when

5,324 km. (3,299 miles) in Transylvania
1,234 km. (765 miles) in Bessarabia
555 km. (344 miles) in Northern Bucovina

were transferred to Rumania. As a break of gauge existed between the railways of old Rumania and those in the former Russian State of Bessarabia, conversion to the 4ft. 8½in. gauge had to be undertaken. Short sections of line are owned by 17 private companies, but all the lines of any importance are State-owned.

[655]

Rumania was relatively well furnished with railway communications. The length of railway line per 100 sq. km. in 1936 was 3.8 km. (6.3 miles per 100 sq. miles), the same as in Yugoslavia, while in Bulgaria it was 3.2 km. (5.1 miles per 100 sq. miles), and the commercial requirements of the country were adequately served thereby. Since the 1914–18 war, the difficulties connected with the unification of three different systems of railway (Hungarian, Russian and Rumanian) were gradually overcome, and with the conversion of the Russian-gauge track in Bessarabia, the railway organisation became more or less standardised. Three of Rumania's five frontiers were crossed by main lines and the other two by branch lines.

1. *Polish Frontier*

This was crossed by the main Bucarest-Cernăuți line at Cernăuți, and was formerly the direct line for through traffic from Bucarest to Warsaw, but the conversions of the railway system in Russo-Poland from standard to 5 ft. gauge in the autumn of 1939, rendered through traffic to Warsaw by this district route impossible without transhipment.

2. *Hungarian Frontier*

The main lines Bucarest—Arad—Curtici and Bucarest—Oradea—Episcopia Bihor provided direct communication between Bucarest and Western Europe via Budapest.

3. *Yugoslavian Frontiers*

Through traffic from Bucarest to Western Europe via Italy and the Simplon Tunnel was served by the main-line route, Bucarest—Timișoara—Jimbolia.

4. *Bulgarian Frontier*

The only direct railway connection between Bucarest and Sofia was by a roundabout route from Bucarest through the Dobruja. The shortest route was by train to Giurgiu, whence ferry steamers cross the Danube to the Bulgarian railway at Ruse.

5. *Russian Frontier*

There was only one frontier crossing, at Tighina—Tiraspol, served by the main line to Iași,

496 whence there was a slow train service to Tighina. Change of gauge took place at Tighina and Tiraspol, necessitating transhipment of both passenger and goods traffic at one or other of these points.

From a strategic point of view, the railway system of Rumania suffered from three main disabilities :—

(a) Out of the total of 11,375 km. (7,053 miles) only 491 km. (304 miles) were double tracked.

(b) The railway system of the country was originally constructed to serve the needs of Rumania and Hungary individually, and on account of topographical and political difficulties communications between the two countries were limited to the minimum requirements. As a result, communications across the Carpathian Mountains were quite inadequate, consisting only of three single-line railways.

(c) The railway system of Transylvania was constructed with a view to the defence of the old Hungarian eastern frontier along the Carpathians, and is, in consequence, particularly ill-adapted for north-to-south movements.

[655] The Rumanaian State Railways (*Regia Autonomă a Căilor Ferate Române*—in short C.F.R.), set up in 1929, was directed by an Administrative Council in Bucarest, consisting of 11 members, including a representative of the Minister of Communications. In addition, there was a delegate of the Minister of War and a Government Commissioner with an advisory voice and the right to veto all decisions of the Council. For administrative and maintenance purposes, the railways were divided up into four separate Managing Directions at Bucarest, Timişoara, Cluj and Iaşi.

2. Principal Routes

The principal railway routes are set out below :—

1. Jimbolia (Yugoslav frontier)—Timişoara—Craiova—Bucarest, of comparatively recent reconstruction and relatively well maintained.

2. Curtici—Arad—Vintul-de-Jos—Sighişoara—Braşov—Bucarest, which is a main route from the Hungarian frontier.

3. Episcopia Bihor—Cluj—Teiuş—Sighişoara—Braşov—Bucarest, a main route from the Hungarian frontier Episcopia Bihor (Budapest and Vienna) to Bucarest, using, between Teiuş and Bucarest, the same line as route 2.

4. Orăşeni—Cernăuţi—Paşcani—Adjud—Mărăşeşti—Buzau—Ploeşti—Bucarest. This was formerly the direct route between Bucarest and Warsaw, and is a natural route for traffic between Eastern and Central Rumania (including the oilfields) and Eastern and Northern Germany.

5. Chişinău—Iaşi—Tecuci—Buzău—Bucarest. This line, as from Iaşi, was reconstructed a few years ago.

6. Chişinău—Reni—Galaţi—Brăila—Buzău—Bucarest.

7. Constanţa—Feteşti—Ciulniţa—Bucarest. This line, connecting Bucarest with the Black Sea port of Constanţa, was reconstructed a few years ago.

CHAPTER VIII

496 8. Bucarest—Oltenița, a port station on the Danube.

9. Bucarest—Giurgiu, an important Danube port opposite Ruse (Bulgaria).

10. Arad—Oradea—Satu Mare—Halmeu—Cîmpulung pe Tisa—Sighet—Valea Visaului—Vișeul de Sus—Borșa.

11. Satu Mare—Baia Mare—Jibou—Dej—Apahida.

12. Dej—Beclean—Ilva Mica—Vatra Dornei—Dărmănești.

3. Staff

497 In 1938 the personnel of the Rumanian State Railways was as follows :—

General and Divisional Headquarters	8,037
Maintenance and Supervision of Permanent Way	13,730
Engine Crews	4,705
Sheds and Workshops	7,584
Main Workshops	21,260
Stations	20,947
Train Staff	6,081
Various	2,322
Total	84,666

4. Locomotives and Rolling-Stock

493 In 1939 there were 3,383 standard-gauge locomotives (2,899 tender type and 484 tank type). As regards narrow-gauge locomotives, figures for 1939 are not available, but in 1938, there were 108 (17 tender type and 91 tank type). Railcars in 1938 totalled 236, of which 8 were steam-operated.

ROLLING-STOCK 1938

(1939 *figures, where available, in brackets*)

	Standard Gauge	*Narrow Gauge*
Total No. of Wagons	62,487	920
Ordinary Wagons	52,107 (53,320)	917 (881)
of which covered	22,670 (23,233)	127 (153)
open	29,437 (30,097)	790 (728)
Special Wagons	1,666	3
of which Tank (state owned)	1,142	3
Privately owned	8,714	—
of which oil tank	8,613	—
Passenger Coaches	3,711 (3,449)	137 (150)

In view of the importance of the oil traffic, it should be noted that there were about 10,000 tank wagons (8,500 owned by the oil companies and 1,500 by the railways).

Coal is the principal fuel used by the railways, consumption of various fuels in 1938 being :—

Coal	944,000 tons.
Brown Coal	501,000 tons.
Heavy Oil	233,000 tons.
Petrol	7,000 tons.
Wood Fuel	19,000 cubic metres.

5. Traffic

497 The following figures relate to the year 1938—

(a) *Goods (Standard and Narrow-Gauge Lines)*

No. of tons	*Tons—km.*	*Average Haul per Ton—km.*
27,680,179	5,795,043	209

The principal goods normally conveyed by the Rumanian State Railways are petroleum and petroleum products, coal, firewood, timber, grain and building materials.

[40a]

(b) *Passengers*

497 In 1938, 48.7 million passengers were carried over a total distance of 3,765 million km. (2,339 million miles) for an average journey of 77 km. (48 miles).

II. War-time Changes

1. Territorial Changes

496 722 Few railways have so far undergone greater changes, both on account of territorial transfers and alterations in traffic flows as a result of the war than the Rumanian State Railways. Firstly, in 1940 the system suffered considerable dismemberment, in June 1,665 km. (1,032 miles) of standard and 65 km. (40 miles) of narrow gauge in Bessarabia and Northern Bucovina were taken over by the U.S.S.R.; then in September the Vienna Award resulted in the transfer of a large part of Transylvania, including 1,750 km. (985 miles) of standard and 355 km. (220 miles) of narrow gauge line to Hungary, and 70 km. (43 miles) of the Southern Dobruja line were ceded to Bulgaria. Following the German attack on the U.S.S.R. in June, 1941, the Bessarabian and Northern Bucovina lines were recovered in the early autumn of that year and, at the beginning of 1942, the Germans placed the control and operation of the railways in the newly created province of Transnistria in the hands of the Rumanian State Railways. The Transnistrian system consists in essence of the Odessa-Zhmerinka section of the Odessa-Kiev-Lwow main line and all branches (including the Zhmerinka-Mogilev line) on both sides as far as the Dniester (frontier with Rumania) in the west, and the Bug (frontier with the Ukraine) in the east.

Apart from Bessarabia, Northern Bucovina and Transnistria, the Rumanian State Railways have not so far suffered any substanti direct physical damage. The Russians on their occupation of Bessarabia and Northern Bucovina in June 1940 at once converted all lines from the standard European to the Russian gauge, a task which was made easier by the fact that the system had, prior to 1920, been Russian gauge. The Russians, in spite of the resultant difference in gauge, insisted on taking over all standard-gauge locomotives and rolling-stock formerly in use in the territories, even where this had already been withdrawn by the Rumanians. The Russians during their subsequent evacuation of these provinces, and also of Transnistria, withdrew or destroyed virtually all their locomotives and rolling-stock, and on the whole effectively damaged or destroyed the track, bridges, stations and equipment. The Rumanians, therefore, found themselves faced with the task of reconstructing and reconverting back to standard gauge the lines taken over, and of providing the necessary locomotives, rolling stock equipment and staff to work the traffic. The Transnistrian system from the railway point of view represented a liability rather than an asset.

It was not until the end of 1941 that the lines in Bessarabia and Bucovina were all re-opened, and until early in 1942 that traffic was being worked to and from Transnistria. The Transnistrian system possesses a measure of autonomy, believed in practice to be mainly legal and financial, but for practical purposes the lines are operated as an integral part of the Rumanian system. The transfer of the Transylvanian lines to Hungary and the Southern Dobruja line to Bulgaria were effected without any physical damage and, as far as is known, no locomotives or rolling-stock were handed over by the Rumanians in either case. The change was primarily administrative, but

496 722 normal traffic was disorganised for several weeks owing to troop movements, the transfer of population, evacuation of equipment and other problems incidental to the transfer of the territory.

497 722 All these changes of necessity caused considerable problems, particularly administrative and considerably affected traffic working. Of the four Divisions in 1939, most of the Cluj Division including Cluj itself and the Tunel-Cluj-Oradea section of the Bucarest-Ploeşti-Cluj-Oradea-Budapest main line, together with part of the Timişoara Division, were transferred to Hungary. Half of the Cernăuţi Division, including Cernăuţi itself and a section of the Bucarest-Ploeşti-Cernăuţi-Lwow main line, was transferred to the U.S.S.R., and parts of the Bucarest Division were transferred to all three countries. The operation of the system was reorganised and centralised under a military directorate in Bucarest, to which German liaison officers have been attached to co-ordinate working and ensure that all German requirements are met. While these officers must presumably have certain powers, and there are also German officers—thought to be equivalent to R.T.O.—at the more important junctions and traffic centres, there is no evidence that the Rumanian State Railways have ever been under direct German control, or that their autonomy has been seriously impaired.

The Rumanian Authorities have had to cope with all these territorial changes and resultant administrative problems during a period when traffic was both considerably heavier than, and the flows entirely different from, before the war. The closing of the sea routes between Rumania and Germany in September 1939—and since June 1940 largely with Italy and the Northern Mediterranean coast—resulted in the transfer to the Danube or to the direct rail routes, of all traffic between Rumania and Germany, Italy and the rest of Europe. Owing to the closing of the Bucarest - Ploeşti - Cernăuţi - Lwow - Przemysl - Cracow-Silesia main line from September 1939 to December 1941 (except for a trickle of traffic for a few months) on account of the occupation of Eastern Poland by the U.S.S.R., the Bucarest-Ploeşti-Braşov-Copşa Mică-Teiuş-Cluj-Oradea or Teiuş-Arad-Curtici, and Ploeşti-Bucarest-Orşova-Timişoara lines were called upon to handle all this traffic. An exception was that sent via the Danube, which had to be rail-hauled to and from the Danube ports, particularly Giurgiu and Orşova. Oil has been, apart possibly from military movements, the most important single traffic; and, in general, German traffic has been sent via the Ploeşti-Teiuş-Oradea and Arad routes and Italian traffic via the Bucarest-Timişoara route.

From early in 1941 when the Germans began to move into the Balkans, first for the Yugoslav/Greek and then the Russian campaign, the Rumanian railways have had to carry in addition large numbers of troops and quantities of supplies. During the Yugoslav campaign when all routes to Greece and Bulgaria via this latter country were closed, the only all-rail route (apart from ferries over the Danube) into Bulgaria was that via the Cernăvodă Bridge and the Dobruja. Rumania served an important rôle as a base for the attack on the Ukraine, and as the German front moved eastwards the Bucarest-Ploeşti-Buzău-Cernăuţi, Buzau-Galaţi-Teghina and Bucarest-Constanţa lines became important as supply routes to the Eastern Front.

2. New Construction and Improvements of the Railway System

499 The lines, which with the exception of the Bucarest-Ploeşti-Câmpina and Ploeşti-Buzău sec-